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THE PRACTICAL TURN IN 
PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS: A 
PORTRAIT OF A YOUNG DISCIPLINE
abstract
In the present article, the current situation of the so-called philosophy of mathematical practice is 
discussed. First, its emergence is evaluated in relation to the “practical” turn in philosophy of science 
and in philosophy of mathematics. Second, the variety of approaches concerned with the practice of 
mathematics and the new topics being now object of research are introduced. Third, the possible replies 
to the question about what counts as mathematical practice are taken into account. Finally, some of the 
problems that are still open in the philosophy of mathematical practice are presented and some possible 
new directions of research considered.
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THE PRACTICAL TURN IN PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
Starting from the 1970s, philosophy of science has shown a tendency to move more and more 
away from the definition of abstract and general theories about scientific knowledge towards 
the investigation of the concrete work that scientists as practitioners in a particular scientific 
field are engaged in everyday. This change of perspective has commonly been labeled as the 
“practical” or “practice” turn:1 science is not conceived anymore as true and justified belief 
that has to be examined, so to speak, in vitro, but as a mingle of different practices that should 
be considered in vivo, looking at the behaviors and the habits characterizing the people 
involved in them. 
There were reasons for this new perspective to emerge. First, in reaction to views of science 
that were too disembodied: science cannot be science from nowhere; second, in opposition to 
the “rational reconstructions” that were typical of the philosophy of science of the beginning 
of the 20th century: science cannot either be science from anywhere. According to this new line 
of thought, the scientific enterprise is analogous to other human practices: it is historically and 
culturally situated, and the task of philosophy should be to clarify its specificities. 
However, the consequences of such a practical “revolution” are still under discussion. First of 
all, was it really a revolution? And if this is the case, in which way was it revolutionary? What 
are the new objects of research? What is its methodology? In other words, where exactly has 
the practical turn led us?2 These questions and analogous ones have been at the center of the 
recent debate, starting from famous proposals such as Kuhn (1962)’s notion of paradigm up to 
naturalistic approaches, which totally deny the possibility of a priori knowledge and embrace 
some form of empiricism or pragmatism.
Many of these issues go back to a crucial ambiguity concerning in general “practice-based” 
approaches. How is ‘practice’ defined? Is there just one practice or are there many? And if 
there are many, what are their common features?3 As Salanskis (2014) has very conveniently 
summarized, 
if the very program of practice turn is to be significant, it must recommend looking at 
science in a specific way, which can then be contrasted with other ways. This absolutely 
1  For details about the introduction of this term, see Soler et al. (2014, p. 39, n. 1).
2  For an in-depth discussion of these topics, see Soler et al. (2014).








requires that we have at our disposal a non universally encompassing notion of practice 
(p. 44).
Compared to the case of philosophy of science, a practical turn in philosophy of mathematics 
has happened later and only partially.4 As Hersh (2005) puts it, in the 1970s philosophy of 
science was already in its renaissance, while most of philosophy of mathematics rather 
looked as “foundationalist ping-pong” (p. vii). An evident exception was Lakatos’ Proofs and 
Refutations (1975), a book which, according to Hersh, is surely fascinating but was however 
virtually unknown at the time. Moreover, despite Lakatos’ approach finds inspiration in 
Polya’s previous work on problem-solving and is undoubtedly new and original, his book 
ends up being a sort of hybrid, caught between the before and after the practical turn. In 
fact, the dialogue between the characters in the book still offers a rational reconstruction 
of the Theorem of Descartes-Euler, even if it is a reconstruction of the process leading to its 
mathematical proof and not of its mathematical proof itself. However, in the footnotes there 
happens to be another book, which tells us the story of the development of the same theorem. 
The result is somewhat schizophrenic: the theorem is an historical product but it can still be 
discussed “from anywhere”. 
The situation did not change in the following decades, with some exceptions, such as the 
collection edited by Tymoczko (Ed.) (1986; rev. ed. 1998), which contained articles criticizing 
the contemporary philosophy of mathematics, or the one edited by Aspray and Kitcher (Eds.) 
(1988), which had a strong interdisciplinary line of attack to modern mathematics. In the 
1990s, van Bendegem (1993) writes as follows: “if science is what scientists do, as it has become 
fashionable to claim, should it then not be the case that mathematics is what mathematicians 
do?” (p. 263). Kuhn himself would be reluctant to reply unhesitatingly ‘yes’ to such a 
question, since in his view mathematics has a special status that seems to elude the typical 
complications having to do with change and scientific development; by contrast, Lakatos’ 
answer would undeniably be positive. However, as van Bendegem points out, differently 
from philosophy of science, in the philosophy of mathematics of the 1990s there still existed 
something like a “received view”: mathematics tended to be considered always – and wrongly, 
according to him – as “the exact science”.
A sharp distinction between the research in philosophy of science and in philosophy of 
mathematics is however very surprising: on the one hand, mathematics is a scientific 
discipline; on the other hand, science makes use of many mathematical tools.5 However, 
because of its supposed special status compared to other scientific disciplines, mathematics 
has also built strong connections with formal logic, a discipline that did not exist before 
the work of Frege. In fact, a drastic change took place even before Frege: if up to the 19th 
century mathematics was conceived as a discipline that, in one way or another, aimed at 
describing the real world, it later became an independent corpus of ideas that are proper to 
mathematics and mathematics only. This conception brought to new questions relative to 
the nature of mathematics that are very familiar today: if mathematics does not speak about 
the real world, what is its object of study? It also led to the search for stable foundations for 
mathematics. For these reasons, at the turn of the 20th century, philosophy of mathematics 
was specifically concerned with topics such as justification and formal mathematics, leaving 
4  This is even more striking for philosophy of logic, but for reasons of space I won’t expand on this issue here.
5  The argument of the indispensability of mathematics for the sciences has also brought about reasons to believe in 
the existence of mathematical entities. For a recent debate on the subject, see for reference Panza and Sereni (2013, 
chapters 6 and 7).
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aside more epistemological issues.6 Recently however, an interest toward philosophical 
questions about the practice of mathematics has finally risen, undoubtedly in reaction 
to this neglect. Mancosu, in his introduction to a collection of essays published less than 
10 years ago entitled The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, claims that the works in the 
book represent “the first steps in a very difficult area and we hope that our efforts might 
stimulate others to do better” (p. 20). In 2009, the Association for the Philosophy of Mathematical 
Practice (APMP) was created.7 
The picture of the philosophy of mathematical practice emerging today is very varied and 
heterogeneous. In Section 2, I will present some possible ways of sorting out the different 
approaches that have been proposed so far in this domain. In Section 3, I will briefly go back 
to the problem of how to define a mathematical practice. Finally, in Section 4, I will sketch a 
picture of the philosophy of mathematical practice today and draw some tentative conclusions 
about the most crucial issues that remain open.
One evident feature of the philosophy of mathematical practice in 2017 is that it is 
characterized by a variety of different proposals and different methodologies, which only in 
some cases overlap or happen to be complementary. Recently, some authors have tried to 
identify the distinct orientations. I will focus in particular on two proposals. 
Van Bendegem (2014) presents a list of eight disciplines that look at mathematics from the 
point of view of its practice: (1) the Lakatosian approach, namely the “maverick” tradition; 
(2) the descriptive analytical naturalizing approach; (3) the normative analytical naturalizing 
approach; (4) the sociology of mathematics approach; (5) the mathematics educationalist approach; 
(6) the ethno-mathematical approach; (7) the evolutionary biology of mathematics; and (8) the 
cognitive psychology of mathematics. For him, only the first three perspectives have a distinct 
philosophical nature, which means that philosophy is not alone in the enterprise; this 
establishes already a difference with the received view of mathematics as the exact science. 
The Lakatosian approach goes back to Proofs and Refutations: to make sense of the development 
of mathematics, it is essential to understand discovery processes. This is in tension with a 
second tradition that mainly refers to Kitcher’s work.8 According to this tradition, which van 
Bendegem labels “analytical and naturalizing”, the object of research is the final version of 
the proof and the desideratum is to find out what is needed to justify the claim that such a final 
version is indeed a proof. Differently from the first approach, such a justification is here totally 
independent of the process that has brought to the proof. In fact, the analytical naturalizing 
approach is related to the more general agenda in analytic philosophy and in particular to 
Quine’s program of naturalizing epistemology, and breaks down into the descriptive and the 
normative analytic naturalizing approaches. For the descriptive approach, the methodology 
is simply to relate what mathematicians think about their everyday work, for example about 
what counts for them as a proof; for the normative approach, the methodology is to examine 
the nature of the proofs that are put forward by mathematicians and to establish whether they 
are genuine proofs, no matter what the mathematicians’ beliefs are. Proposals from (4) to (8) 
6  In Agazzi and Heinzmann (2015)’s reconstruction, it is precisely to overcome the foundational crisis that affected 
the exact sciences, mathematics and physics, at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, that new 
trends and ideas in philosophy were produced and philosophy of science in its contemporary sense was born. Such a 
crisis challenged “the pervasive positivist view that had attributed to science the monopole of secure knowledge and 
the role of being the ground of human progress” (p. 8).
7  In 2017, the APMP will celebrate its fourth international meeting. See for information http://institucional.us.es/
apmp/.
8  See for reference Kitcher (1984). We will go back to Kitcher’s views in the remainder of the article.







are related to disciplines other than philosophy that are however interested in the practice of 
mathematics.9 
From the emerging picture, it is evident that a unity of these distinct approaches is 
questionable and as a consequence the possible unity of the study of mathematical practice 
with traditional philosophy of mathematics is even more problematic.10 Van Bendegem 
(2014)’s charitable suggestion is to keep an open mind and accept “to work in different 
‘registers’ where reading texts in the field (or that I, at least, consider to be relevant)” (p. 221).
In a forthcoming paper, Carter (forthcoming) identifies three different, in some cases 
overlapping, “strands” in the philosophy of mathematical practice: (1) the agent based strand, 
(2) the historical strand, and (3) the epistemological strand. Differently from van Bendegem’s 
proposal, all these strands mainly ask philosophical questions, but in a clear interdisciplinary 
fashion. A crucial point is that according to Carter the philosophy of mathematical practice 
has changed in the most recent years: in fact, it does not develop anymore in contrast with a 
more traditional philosophy of mathematics, but on the contrary is aimed to complement it. 
The agent based strand emerges from the belief that philosophy has to take into account 
the human beings who are doing mathematics. In her reconstruction, this strand develops 
along two lines, the first having strong interconnection with sociology – mathematics is a 
social activity – and the second following the views of philosophers such as Peirce, Dewey 
and Putnam – the so-called pragmatic orientation. The historical strand focuses on the products 
of the activity of doing mathematics and on how such products shape across time. History 
of mathematics is of course an old discipline that has already provided interesting results; 
however, as Carter points out, the possible relationship between philosophy and history is 
still matter of discussion, ranging from positions considering history as philosophically laden 
to others defending the independence of history from philosophy. The third strand that 
Carter calls epistemological “for lack of a better term” is closer to traditional philosophy of 
mathematics. However, differently from it, it does not consider epistemology as a view from 
nowhere but demands that new topics emerging from everyday mathematics be considered as 
philosophically relevant. Other possible names for this strand could be the extension-of-topics 
strand, the phenomenological strand or the philosophy of real mathematics strand.
Van Bendegem claims that if the aim is to consider mathematical practice, then philosophy 
should collaborate with other disciplines; Carter seems instead to argue that philosophy itself 
should be open to change its nature in view of contributions coming from other disciplines. 
Moreover, for both of them, the listed approaches are not exclusive, as some scholars happen 
to endorse more than one. The picture of the philosophy of mathematical practice that results 
from these two proposals is evidently complex and in progress. 
Instead of presenting a new possible catalog of the available views, I will introduce here briefly 
three categories of new questions about mathematics that have clearly emerged. As Soler and 
Jullien (2014) claim, 
dynamic, genetic, and heuristic aspects were largely ignored from the pre-practice turn 
philosophy of science (including mathematics), and the simple fact to take them as an 
object of study has often worked as a sufficient reason to classify an author as an actor 
of the practice turn (p. 232). 
9  Löwe (2016) explores the interplay between philosophy and other disciplines and its effect on the further 
development of the field. 
10  See the comment to van Bendegem’s contribution by Soler and Jullien (2014).
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I will follow their hint and focus on these three concerns in turn. 
1. Dynamic aspects. One question formulated by Lakatos himself has not been answered yet: 
can we talk about ‘progress’ in mathematics? Does mathematics evolve? And if this is the case, 
are there constraints in its evolution? These issues were among the first to be considered by 
pioneering works going beyond traditional worries about mathematics. In particular, two 
collections focused on “revolutions” in mathematics – Gillies (Ed.), 1992 – and on the “growth” 
of mathematical knowledge – Grosholz & Breger (Eds.), 2000. However, in more recent years, 
the attention has moved away from questions about change in mathematics to new emerging 
topics in this category. One relevant subject is the consideration of values in mathematics that 
might influence the direction of research, for example when a certain framework is recognized 
as interesting, fruitful, providing explanations, or containing promises of solution. What do 
all these expressions mean? On this subject, it is not clear yet if and how sociological elements 
may be taken into account.
2. Genetic aspects. When it comes to the genetic aspects of mathematics, history of 
mathematics on the one hand and cognitive science on the other become relevant. Many 
authors have acknowledged the importance of an historical perspective to investigate 
mathematical practice. Corfield (2003) points out that in the course of the 20th century, 
philosophy moved its attention away from the real mathematical progresses because of the 
“foundationalist filter” that is the “unhappy” idea behind all forms of neo-logicism. In his 
view, the job of the philosopher is to dismantle such filter: mathematics is a human activity, 
and therefore it is situated in time. An interdisciplinary investigation may be of help, “in 
the process demonstrating that philosophers, historians and sociologists working on pre-
1900 mathematics are contributing to our understanding of mathematical thought, rather 
than acting as chroniclers of proto-rigorous mathematics” (p. 8). The interest in looking at 
the research in cognitive science for a philosophy of mathematical practice is instead more 
controversial. Some scholars have explicitly discussed cognitive science research, for example 
Giaquinto (2006) and Ferreiros (2015). However, a shared intuition is that much work still 
need to be done to understand what exactly the views about the cognitive foundations of 
mathematics (Butterworth, 1999; Dehaene, 2007) or the role of conceptual metaphors and 
conceptual blending in mathematics (Lakoff & Nunez, 2001) might bring to the consideration 
in particular of the practice of advanced mathematics.11
3. Heuristic aspects. This category of problems goes back to typical themes from the work 
of Polya (1945) about the methods to put in place to solve mathematical problems. To give 
an example, one subject that has been very extensively addressed in the most recent years 
is the use of diagrams in mathematics.12 However, thinking in terms of heuristics might be 
misleading, since heuristics pertains traditionally to the context of discovery but is not part of 
the context of justification, where proofs are “syntactic objects consisting only of sentences 
arranged in a finite and inspectable way”13. However, a crucial point about the consideration 
of the role of representations, notations and other kinds of cognitive tools is the evaluation 
of the influence that they might have on understanding and even on creating mathematics. 
11  Some of these issues are discussed in Schlimm (2013) and Giardino (2014). 
12  For a survey of the studies about diagrammatic reasoning in mathematics, see Giardino (2017).
13  This passage is quoted from Tennant in Barwise and Etchemendy (1996, p. 3) as expressing the “dogma” of 
logocentricity that they want to challenge. 
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It is possible to argue that some proofs, because of their format, have both a heuristic and 
a justificatory role. For these reasons, the distinction between a context of discovery and a 
context of justification has become more and more precarious.
In the next section, I will discuss how this heterogeneity of topics for the philosophy of the 
mathematical practice is reflected in the heterogeneity of possible answers that are given to 
the question of what a mathematical practice is. 
As for philosophy of science, a major difficulty for the philosophy of mathematical practice 
is how to intend ‘mathematical practice’.14 What do we talk about when we talk about a 
mathematical practice? Under which conditions is an agent recognized as a practitioner? Shall 
we talk about one practice or more practices? In other words, do several practices exist within 
one same practice? 
On the website of the APMP, the philosophy of mathematical practice is defined as “a broad 
outward-looking approach” to the study of mathematics “which engages with mathematics 
in practice (including issues in history of mathematics, the applications of mathematics, 
cognitive science, etc.)”. This definition is indeed far-reaching, most likely to the aim of being 
as inclusive as possible given the current state of the domain.
Famously, Kitcher (1984) defined a mathematical practice as the quintuple <L, M, S, R, Q> 
composed by Language, Metamathematical views, accepted Statements, Reasoning methods 
and Questions (chapters 7 and 8). Some authors thought of extending or reconsidering 
this quintuple. For example, Ferreiros (2015, chapter 3) has recently pointed out that 
Kitcher’s quintuple is misleading because it is still based on an analysis of the production 
of scientific knowledge that depends mainly on linguistic knowledge. If the approach is 
instead intended to be agent-based and practice-oriented, non-linguistic elements, such 
as for example some forms of tacit knowledge, become relevant. For this reason, Ferreiros 
argues that it is necessary to think in terms of the couple Framework plus Agent, to whom 
the metamathematical views belong. Moreover, frameworks are of two kinds: theoretical and 
symbolic. However, the Framework-Agent pair is not identified with mathematical practice but 
is at the core of practice and of the production and reproduction of knowledge. As it is evident, 
the picture gets more and more complex.15
Of course, scholars who are interested in the philosophy of mathematical practice seem to 
share some notion of practice, but this happens on the surface, while the devil is in the details. 
In fact, the variety of philosophies of mathematical practice described in the previous section 
is indeed reflected in the variety of possible views about mathematical practice. For this 
reason, I propose here to identify (at least) four replies that philosophers of the mathematical 
practice might give to the question about mathematical practice. 
I will call the first reply (1) the situated reply. Mathematical practice is a historically 
situated human activity, and therefore the aim of the philosophy of mathematical practice 
is to reconstruct the history of the different practices. If mathematics is truly what 
mathematicians do, then this target has considerably varied over times and places; as a 
consequence, mathematical practice must be understood in a way that would include this 
variance. A static view of mathematics considering it as merely a collection of theories, 
14  To be true, also the very definition of a practice in general is problematic, and therefore it is not clear how to 
intend the claim that mathematics is analogous to other human practices.
15  Another extension of Kitcher’s model was proposed by van Kerkhove & van Bendegem (2004), who generalized 
it and arrived at a seventuple <M, P, F, PM, C, AM, PS>, containing a mathematical community M of individual 
mathematicians, a research program P, a formal language F, a set PM of proof methods, a set C of concepts, a set AM of 
argumentative methods and a set PS of proof strategies. Also in this case, the model gets more convoluted.
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independent of human activities, is misleading, and it is necessary to move towards a 
dynamic view of mathematics. Of course, Lakatos’ lesson is always in the background. 
The target of the philosophical investigation is the subject matter of mathematics at 
each time: mathematical theories, theorems, and proofs. Of course, these objects may be 
presented in different formats and media, and there is an interest in considering their 
development.
The second reply is (2) the semiotic reply. Mathematical practice is a human activity 
implying the use of many different tools, more importantly several kinds of texts, which 
are the target of the philosophical research. Mathematicians in their everyday work 
write drafts, inscriptions, publications; they draw objects, calculate on paper, and write 
demonstrations. These are all elements of the practice of mathematics, and they can 
be analyzed one by one without leaving aside their mutual relations. The mathematical 
practice has then to do with the traces of mathematics that are left in sketchbooks, 
textbooks, essays, and proofs.
The third reply is (3) the epistemological reply. Mathematical practice is the construction of 
theories, but this does not imply endorsing more dogmatic points of view, for example the 
claim that such theories are necessarily formal systems. As Mancosu (2008) claims, 
the epistemology of mathematics needs to be extended well beyond its present 
confines to address epistemological issues having to do with fruitfulness, evidence, 
visualization, diagrammatic reasoning, understanding, explanation and other aspects of 
mathematical epistemology which are orthogonal to the problem of access to ‘abstract 
objects’ (pp. 1-2).
Despite the fact that case studies are necessary precisely because certain areas of mathematics 
can provide useful tools for addressing important philosophical problems, such approach is 
not meant to be simply a description of the mathematical theories and of their growth.16
The fourth reply is (4) the pragmatist reply. For example, for Ferreiros (2015), mathematical 
practice is what the community of mathematicians does when they employ resources such as 
frameworks and other tools to the aim of solving problems, proving theorems, and in some cases 
elaborating new theories and frameworks. Moreover, the choice of these tools is constrained by 
their cognitive abilities. The study of mathematical practice broadens the scope of philosophical 
and historical studies by considering carefully the contexts from which mathematical theories 
and proofs emerge, and issues such as understanding beyond mere logical reconstruction 
become crucial. Ferreiros’ approach is agent-based: practice can be understood only by focusing 
on practitioners; moreover, it is pragmatist and historically oriented.
As for the approaches in the previous section, these groups of replies are of course not 
disconnected from each other. For example, the semiotic reply has clearly epistemological 
interests as well;17 or, for both the situated and the epistemological reply, the construction 
of theories and the notion of proof are still two crucial issues in the investigation of 
mathematical practice.
16  I will come back to this issue in the last section. 
17  For example Chemla (2009), discussing the importance of learning to read mathematical texts, explicitly refers to 
the notion of “epistemological cultures” as introduced by Fox Keller (2002) to define the primordial character of the 
specific epistemological choices that are made and shared by the agents of cultures that are far from ours. 
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The emerging picture of the philosophy of mathematical practice seems thus to describe a 
domain of research, mathematics, which has lost its unity because it is now partitioned in 
many different case studies. More importantly, there is neither unity in the philosophy of 
mathematical practice itself, since each of the distinct approaches may endorse different 
points of view on each of these case studies. With this worry in mind, in this last section I will 
discuss some open problems.
First, the relation between the philosophy of mathematical practice and traditional philosophy 
of mathematics is not easy to evaluate. Many scholars believe that there is a true need for an 
extension of the theoretical inquiry that would address topics ignored by the foundationalist 
tradition (because of what Corfield called the “foundationalist filter”). As Mancosu (2008) 
highlights, the philosophical literature has extensively pursued the Benecerraf’s ontological and 
epistemological problems (are there abstract objects? and if there are, how can we access them?) 
and without this extension, it risks being drastically impoverished. However, this does not mean 
that the work in traditional philosophy of mathematics has to be forgotten or considered as 
irrelevant. On the contrary, the tools that it has provided can be extended as well to new areas 
of research that have been previously largely neglected. As he sums up, philosophers today 
are less ambitious and at the same time more ambitious than before. They are less ambitious 
because differently from scholars such as Lakatos or Kitcher, they are not concerned anymore 
with metaphilosophical issues; however, they are more ambitious because they want to cover “a 
broad spectrum of case studies arising from mathematical practice” that are subject to analytic 
investigation (p. 14). In a motto: less metaphysical questions, more topics addressed.
Second, it is not clear what the purpose of philosophy should be in considering the practice 
of mathematics. Some approaches aim at maintaining a normative role for philosophy while 
others consider that the research in philosophy should provide an attentive description 
of the situated practice. This might create some tension. In fact, a potential risk is that too 
much focus on practice will end up dispelling philosophy. As Maddy (1997) already argued in 
Naturalism in Mathematics:
if our philosophical account of mathematics comes into conflict with successful 
mathematical practice, it is the philosophy that must give. […] Similar sentiments 
appear in the writings of many philosophers of mathematics who hold that the goal 
of philosophy of mathematics is to account for mathematics as it is practiced, not to 
recommend reform (p. 161). 
However, many philosophers of the mathematical practice today would not subscribe to 
Maddy’s naturalistic claim (in her specified meaning of this term).
Third, another issue not settled yet is the autonomy of mathematics from the natural sciences. 
In his book, Ferreiros (2015) emphasizes the interplay between mathematics and other 
kinds of practices. In his view, the problem of the “applicability” of mathematics should not 
be considered as external to mathematical knowledge but on the contrary as internal to its 
analysis. There is no opposition between “pure” and “applied” mathematics, since to some 
extent all frameworks are designed to be applicable.
Fourth, for many of the different views that have been described so far, practice has to do 
with some form of action. However, an appropriate analysis of this feature in the practice is 
still lacking.18 In this spirit, a promising direction of research will be to explore the view of 
mathematical knowledge as a knowing-how, as practical and/or tacit knowledge, in contrast 
18  One attempt in this direction is made in Salanskis (2014). 
4. Conclusions: 
A Pluralism of 
Approaches
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with or more modestly in addition to the standard view of mathematical knowledge as a 
knowing-that.
To quote again van Bandegem (2014), 
if all of this looks rather sketchy, it is important to realize, […] that we are looking, in 
comparison with developments in the philosophy of science, at a very young discipline. 
Nevertheless, I do think it is important, right from the start, to look for collaborations 
and not exclusions. Exclusions are only to be accepted when everything else fails, and 
this is definitely not the case at the present moment (p. 224, emphasis added).
Moreover, I would argue that this lack of unity in the philosophy of mathematical practice is 
to some extent what is really revolutionary about it: after the practical turn, the territory of 
philosophical inquiry has radically changed. Enterprises such as the identification of criteria 
of validity for what counts as a mathematical proof have become local enterprises, which may 
vary in their methodology and in their results depending on the particular practice and on 
the particular case study that are taken at each time into account. It would then seem that 
mathematics, which was considered as a stable, static, certain, exact science not subject to change 
or development, has finally exploded into pieces and it will be impossible for philosophy ever 
again to provide a unitary account for it. Alternatively, an improved philosophy of mathematics 
will consider this as an occasion to specify new questions and take really into account the actual 
richness of its domain of interest in all its complexity. Will the philosophy of mathematical 
practice ever become an adult discipline? More time is needed to reply to this question.
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